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THE MISUSE OF PRODUCT MISUSE: VICTIM 
BLAMING AT ITS WORST 
ROBERT S. ADLER* 
ANDREW F. POPPER** 
ABSTRACT 
This Paper addresses the legal consequences that surface 
when a consumer uses a product in a manner not specifically in-
tended by that product’s designer or manufacturer. If a product is 
used in a reasonably foreseeable manner, the fact that the use is 
at odds with a manufacturer’s intention should not be a basis to 
deny tort liability or limit the regulatory options of the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission. If a product proves to be unsafe, defec-
tive, dangerous, or otherwise hazardous to users and consumers, 
use patterns should not be the primary determinant in assessing 
regulatory and common law sanctions or consequences. While pro-
ducers may wish to limit tort liability or regulatory impact by 
characterizing as wrongful all uses not fully consistent with spec-
ified instructions, limiting tort liability or regulatory impact is 
indefensible, inhumane, and at odds with common law tort prin-
ciples and the clear purposes of the Consumer Product Safety Act. 
Penalizing consumers for uses that are reasonable but not expressly 
intended is little more than victim blaming. A legal culture that 
scapegoats consumers is justly seen as pathological regulatory cap-
ture. Ramped up consumer misuse standards reward those who 
create risks and punish those who are harmed. That cannot pos-
sibly be the goal of the common law or the legacy anticipated when 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission was formed nearly a 
half-century ago. 
                                                                                                                        
* Commissioner, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. 
** Bronfman Professor of Law and Government, American University Wash-
ington College of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 50-50-90 rule: anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting 
something right, there’s a 90 [percent] probability you’ll get it 
wrong. 
?Andy Rooney, 60 Minutes1 
 
Even monkeys fall from trees. 
?Chris Bradford, The Ring of Earth2 
Everyone makes mistakes,3 which means that all of us, as 
consumers, will undoubtedly be guilty of misusing products at some 
time in our lives. Fortunately, most of our mistakes will result in 
inconvenience and embarrassment rather than broken bones or 
worse. However, there are times when a slight loss of attention, 
a distraction, or a failure to heed warnings or follow instructions 
can mean disaster. 
No rational actor seeks injury—but there are times when 
product misuse (mistakes in attentiveness, care, or judgment in 
                                                                                                                        
1 Andy Rooney Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes 
/andy_rooney_194055 [https://perma.cc/WW9M-CS5Y]. 
2 CHRIS BRADFORD, YOUNG SAMURAI: THE RING OF EARTH 200 (2010). 
3 There is a large body of literature on how and why we make mistakes, most 
predicated on the fact that being hardwired as humans makes it inevitable that 
we will err. See e.g., JOSEPH T. HALLINAN, WHY WE MAKE MISTAKES: HOW WE 
LOOK WITHOUT SEEING, FORGET THINGS IN SECONDS, AND ARE ALL PRETTY 
SURE WE ARE WAY ABOVE AVERAGE 2–3 (2009) (studying human error and 
scientific reasons why it exists through real-life stories); Olga Khazan, Why 
Mistakes Are Often Repeated, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlan 
tic.com/science/archive/2016/02/why-mistakes-are-often-repeated/470778/ [http:// 
perma.cc/Y28T-PM4D] (discussing neurological reasons why failure to learn from 
past mistakes causes people to repeatedly make the same mistakes); Sophie 
Morris, Oops, We Did it Again—Why We Make Mistakes, INDEPENDENT 
(Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/artsentertainment/books/features 
/oops-we-did-it-again-why-we-make-mistakes-1645571.html [http://perma.cc 
/5A4C-SCFZ] (looking at ways to avoid the simple errors humans inevitably make 
every day); Why Clever People Make More Mistakes Than Most, BBC CAPITAL 
(Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20151119-why-clever-people 
-make-more-stupid-mistakes-than-everyone-else [http://perma.cc/A58X-PPU4] 
(distinguishing intelligence from rational thinking and reasoning that the most 
successful people often make mistakes others do not because of certain personality 
traits); Why Making Mistakes Is What Makes Us Human, KQED (Sept. 2, 2015), 
https://ww2.kqed.org/mindshift/2015/09/02/making-mistakes-is-what-makes-us 
-human/ [http://perma.cc/S4WJ-6TLR] (describing Kathryn Shultz’s TED Talk 
on seeing the value in being wrong).  
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the use of a product) results in the loss of life or limb.4 No one is 
perfect. Stated another way, the one thing that is inevitable is that 
we will err. Those who work in the field of product safety know this 
and, accordingly, strive to articulate, implement, and enforce appro-
priate standards and measures to prevent tragedies that arise 
from product misuse before those harms occur.5 
Product misuse has commanded the attention of various 
observers, commentators, and policymakers over the years.6 The 
debate has revolved around the extent to which a health and safety 
agency like the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 
should regulate when consumers have been injured or killed using 
products in ways not intended or sanctioned by manufacturers, 
but in ways readily foreseeable.7 
When consumers are injured through misuse of a product, 
the regulatory approach and the common law model follow two dif-
ferent policy paths.8 In a product liability action, the conventional 
approach for the last three decades has been to limit9 or deny10 
                                                                                                                        
4 See Robert Adler, Redesigning People Versus Redesigning Products: The 
Consumer Product Safety Commission Addresses Product Misuse, 11 J.L. & 
POL’Y 79, 79 (1995). 
5 See id. at 80. 
6 “Product misuse” has been defined in many different ways. At the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), it ranges from the involuntary or 
unknowing departure from manufacturer’s instructions to deliberate risk taking 
in contravention of known safety norms. The policy implications of product 
misuse have been around as long as health and safety regulation has existed. 
As long-time observers of CPSC, we have focused our comments on the issue at 
CPSC. However, this discussion is applicable to other health and safety agencies 
like FDA, OSHA, and EPA. It is a topic that Commissioner Adler first explored 
almost a quarter century ago. See id. at 81. Sadly, from our perspective, it is an 
issue that never goes away. 
7 See id. at 81, 86. 
8 See id. at 80. 
9 See Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirm-
ing lower court’s reduction of damages based on misuse of sauna equipment 
making the user thirty-five percent negligent); see generally Randy Koenders, 
Products Liability: Product Misuse Defense, 65 A.L.R. 4TH 263, 270–84 (1988) 
(discussing misuse as a defense generally and how individual states approach 
the product misuse defense). 
10 A complete denial of recovery occurs in those states that apply contribu-
tory negligence to cases. A reduction of damages occurs where states apply 
comparative negligence to cases. Most states today follow the latter approach. 
See e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Garrett Cty. v. Bell Atl., 695 A.2d 171, 181 (Md. 
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recovery if the cause of an injury is the unforeseeable misuse11 of 
that product. A foreseeable, but unreasonable use, in contrast, does 
not necessarily cut off liability: “Unforeseeable” and “unreasonable” 
are not synonyms.12 “Therefore, unreasonable misuse is not a de-
fense to a strict liability defective product claim.”13 Thus, an un-
reasonable use may well be a reasonably foreseeable misuse and 
does not necessarily bar liability.14 
The factors in play regarding the debate between unrea-
sonable use and unforeseeable misuse are part of the tort reform 
discourse.15 They involve the potential of significant money 
damages and broader questions underlying strict liability in tort.16 
They are more focused on remedy for an injured person than on 
the broader public safety goals extant in the regulatory domain.17 
Unlike the common law model, Congress and federal agen-
cies have generally adopted a broader approach in the regulatory 
                                                                                                                        
1997); John Cowley & Bros., Inc. v. Brown, 569 So.2d 375, 376 (Ala. 1990); Smith 
v. Fiber Controls Corp., 268 S.E.2d 504, 504 (N.C. 1980); Wingfield v. Peoples 
Drug Store Inc., 379 A.2d 685, 687 (D.C. 1977); Basket v. Banks, 45 S.E.2d 173, 
177 (Va. 1947); Comparative & Contributory Negligence, JUSTIA, https://www 
.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/comparative-contributory-negligence/ [http:// 
perma.cc/7K6C-KDSX] (stating that Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia 
and Washington, D.C. are the only jurisdictions that still apply pure contribu-
tory negligence, which bars a plaintiff from recovering if he or she acted negli-
gently and contributed to the accident in any way); see also William L. 
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1953) (explaining the 
origin of the comparative negligence doctrine). 
11 In this Paper, we distinguish between unforeseeable misuse of a product, a 
common bar to tort liability, and unreasonable uses that reflect a lack of due care 
but are foreseeable that are not necessarily a bar, e.g., using a power lawn mower 
to trim tall weeds or low-lying brush, are not intended uses from a manufacturer’s 
perspective, but are foreseeable. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
890–91 (2d ed. 2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. at p 
(AM. LAW INST. 1998) (endorsing the “unforeseeable misuse” standard). 
12 See Cigna Ins. Co., 241 F.3d at 16–18. 
13 See Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 470, 476 (1991). 
14 Asay v. Kolberg-Pioneer, No. 2:08-CV-01242-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 32390006 
(D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2010) (stating that “[a] plaintiff’s misuse of a product, which is 
not reasonably foreseeable, is ... a defense to strict products liability,” and citing 
Crown Controls Corp. v. Corella, 98 Nev. 35, 37 (1982) (per curiam) which goes 
on to hold that “use of a product that the manufacturer should reasonably antici-
pate is not misuse or abuse.”). 
15 See ANDREW F. POPPER, MATERIALS ON TORT REFORM 16 (2d ed. 2017). 
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A ch. 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
17 See id. 
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product safety context.18 Here, the legislature has directed agencies 
like CPSC to protect even careless consumers from dangerous 
products so long as the protective measures do not unduly raise 
the price or affect the utility of a product.19 This is made clear in 
the Consumer Product Safety Act where the agency is directed 
to make specific findings about the impact of a rule on a product’s 
utility, cost, or availability, but is fully authorized to act in in-
stances where consumer misuse is likely or present.20 The theory 
is that dangerous products that can be rendered safe at minimal 
cost should be made so even when consumers do not act as man-
ufacturers intend.21 As a humane society, we want to reduce un-
necessary pain and suffering especially when the cost of doing so 
is reasonable. Moreover, despite the temptation to invoke moral 
judgments about product misuse (“they deserve what they got”) 
or to insist that harsh treatment of those who blunder will con-
vince consumers to take greater care (“teach them a lesson they 
won’t soon forget”), a significant body of research demonstrates that 
“most accidents are truly accidents, not the result of gambles 
that turn out badly.”22 What is termed “misuse” by producers 
                                                                                                                        
18 See Adler, supra note 4, at 80. 
19 Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–89 (2012); see Guide 51: 
Safety aspects—Guidelines for their inclusion in standards, INT’L ORG. STANDARDI-
ZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N i, v (Jan. 3, 2014) [hereinafter 
ISO Safety Guidelines] (making recommendations for how to draft safety stan-
dards in compliance with international requirements and standards). 
20 § 2058(f)(1) (“Prior to promulgating a consumer product safety rule, the 
Commission shall consider, and make appropriate findings for inclusion for such 
rule with respect to ... the need of the public for the consumer products subject to 
such rule, and the probable effect of such rule upon the utility, cost, or avail-
ability of such products to meet such need.”). 
21 While the primary focus of this Paper is on the CPSC and the regulatory 
environment, the question posed regarding the baseline standard for assessing the 
use of a product by a consumer (intended use vs. reasonably foreseeable use) 
is also one of the core issues in the tort reform discourse as it pertains to tort 
liability in the civil justice system. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. 
LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (AM. LAW. INST. 1998) (attempting to limit liability to intended 
uses rather than reasonably foreseeable uses); ANDREW F. POPPER, MATERIALS ON 
TORT REFORM 16 (2d ed. 2017) (identifying this topic as a tort reform issue); 
Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of Individualism and the Appeal of Tort Reform, 
59 RUTGERS L. REV. 779, 823 (2007) (mentioning the misuse vs. reasonably 
foreseeable use debate). 
22 Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1200 (1994). According to Professor Latin’s research, 
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often turns out not to be blatant risk-taking or mindless care-
lessness, but instead is predictable and utterly human behavior 
such as forgetfulness, lack of knowledge, momentary losses of 
concentration, impulsiveness, or unforeseen distractions.23 
Quite simply, while the doctrine of unforeseeable misuse 
can play a definitive role in certain product liability cases, it is of 
little or no consequence in the regulatory context where the primary 
focus must be on the product itself and not on the misuse of the 
product by a consumer.24 This in no way diminishes the comple-
mentary role tort law plays in the quest for safer products.  
Tort liability can and does achieve the dual goals of per-
sonal remedy and deterrence, sending a powerful and cautionary 
message to producers of the same or similar products.25 For 
product users, as opposed to producers, tort law embodies a very 
different type of deterrence by limiting civil liability in those 
instances where a consumer’s misuse of a product is “so highly 
extraordinary as to be unforeseeable ....”26 In such cases, unfore-
seeable misuse can be considered a “superseding cause” and limits 
or cuts off the defendant’s liability.27 
The Mississippi Supreme Court noted recently: “[I]f the end 
user could always recover damages from a manufacturer, regardless 
of the misuse of the product, customers, beyond concerns of self-
preservation ... would have little incentive to ensure they used the 
product properly.”28 The tort doctrine of unforeseeable misuse, 
“promotes the social goal of both manufacturers and customers 
                                                                                                                        
“[m]ost accidents are truly accidents, not the result of deliberate gambles that 
turn out badly.” Id. A court may assume that serious injury due to failure to 
read warnings was due to “unusually careless or deliberately risky behavior,” 
but in reality, there are avoidable and reasonable explanations for why warn-
ings—even good warnings—are not being read. Id. at 1207. 
23 See Michael S. Wogalter et al., Risk Perception of Common Consumer Prod-
ucts: Judgments of Accident Frequency and Precautionary Intent, 24 J. SAFETY 
RES. 97, 100 (1993) (reporting that individuals overestimate low-probability 
product risks and underestimate high-probability product risks). 
24 Adler, supra note 4, at 115. 
25 Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 191 (2012). 
26 Perez v. VAS S.p.A., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 607 (Ct. App. 2010); see Mine 
Safety Appliance Co. v. Holmes, 171 So. 3d 442, 454 (Miss. 2015). 
27 Mine Safety Appliance Co., 171 So. 3d at 454; Perez, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
607–08. 
28 Mine Safety Appliance Co., 171 So. 3d at 454. 
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exercising due care.”29 However, that unforeseeable misuse of a 
product can limit or bar tort liability in the civil justice system is 
entirely separate from the regulatory goals of product safety at 
the CPSC.30 
Merely because a consumer misuses a product and by do-
ing so is unable to succeed in a cause of action in tort is often 
unrelated to the question of whether a product is unsafe.31 Con-
sider that this limitation on recovery is in play when the consumer’s 
“unforeseeable misuse of the product substantially change[s] the 
condition of the product, and that change, and not the alleged 
defect, is the proximate cause of the alleged injury ....”32 
From a broader perspective: the safety of consumer goods 
is an inarguable public interest. If a product is unsafe because of 
its design, manufacture, or lack of an appropriate warning, the way 
in which one person used—or misused—or unforeseeably misused—
the product is rarely relevant. It is the product itself, not the coinci-
dental misuse that must be the focus of agency action. We strongly 
disagree with those who would bar a health and safety agency 
like CPSC from protecting consumers where misuse has played 
a part in a product’s risk. Our reason is clear: Were CPSC and 
other agencies limited to instances in which injuries, illness, or 
death occurred only during the “proper” or “intended” use of a 
product, many of the agency’s rules and regulations would be 
rendered invalid, exposing consumers to great danger from haz-
ardous products.33 
For example, most ingestions of poisons and toxic chemi-
cals that the Poison Prevention Packaging Act34 guards against 
occur because caregivers inappropriately leave such products free 
                                                                                                                        
29 Id. 
30 See id.  
31 See id. 
32 Id. 
33 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1120.3(b)(1) (2015) (categorizing children’s upper outer-
wear with one or more drawstrings as “substantial product hazards”); 16 C.F.R. 
§ 1511.7 (1977) (“[P]acifiers shall be labelled with the statement: “Warning—
Do Not Tie Pacifier Around Child’s Neck as it Presents a Strangulation Danger.”); 
16 C.F.R. § 1500.83(a)(38)(iv) (2010) (requiring writing instruments containing 
more than three grams of ink to be labeled as “toxic.”). 
34 Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471–75, § 1471 
(2012). 
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for children to access.35 Similarly, the ghastly fire injuries and 
fatalities from flammable fabrics that have triggered CPSC safety 
rules typically result from careless smokers or from unsuper-
vised children playing with matches or lighters.36 Furthermore, 
CPSC can and does take action to address injuries from products 
like lawn mowers that result from consumers’ risky—but com-
pletely predictable—actions, such as putting their hands under 
the housing of a mower to clear debris.37 
In these and similar instances, the Commission has tradi-
tionally adopted Congress’s basic notion that it is far easier to 
redesign hazardous products than to reconfigure careless consum-
ers. Of course, as with any broad policy, there are limits. Where 
consumer misbehavior is highly reckless and constitutes unfore-
seeable misuse, the kinds of precautions that companies should 
have to take to safeguard consumers would generally be beyond 
the duty of care to which a manufacturer should be held.38 
 One final point: equally unpersuasive is the notion that pro-
tecting careless consumers is generally futile because people will 
                                                                                                                        
35 See Eileen M. McDonald et al., Primary Care Opportunities to Prevent 
Unintentional Home Injuries: A Focus on Children and Older Adults, 12 AM. 
J. LIFESTYLE MED. 96, 97 (2018) (urging primary care doctors to play a more 
central role in patient safety to prevent unintentional home injuries). 
36 See 16 C.F.R. § 1602.1(a)–(e) (2012) (Flammable Fabrics Act); see also 
Upholstered Furniture, Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 114, 30735 (June 15, 1994) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1640) (proposing a 
flammability standard for furniture fabrics associated with fires due to small 
open flames, such as cigarettes). 
37 See 16 C.F.R. § 1205.5(a) (implementing blade control systems and a blade 
stopping test for walk-behind power mowers); Lawn Mower Safety, U. S. CON-
SUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N (June 4, 1987), https://www.cpsc.gov/content 
/lawn-mower-safety [http://perma.cc/ZG5D-GSUM] (discussing how new safety 
features on mowers will reduce accidents like injury from contact with the blade). 
38 A good illustration of the distinction made can be found in a recent arti-
cle, Lindsey Bever, Teens are daring each other to eat Tide Pods. We don’t need to 
tell you that’s a bad idea, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.washing 
tonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/01/13/teens-are-daring-each-other-to 
-eat-tide-pods-we-dont-need-to-tell-you-thats-a-bad-idea/?noredirect=on&utm 
_term=.7397b6834d72 [http://perma.cc/C964-53FG]. According to the article, 
a number of teenagers on social media have developed a fad of intentionally 
biting into brightly colored, highly toxic liquid laundry packets. In contrast, 
thousands of children under age five have innocently bitten into the packets 
believing them to be candy. Id. The latter group is the one that most deserves 
societal protection. 
346 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:337 
simply take more risks when products are made safer.39 The idea 
that people will blindly take calculated or even unreasonable 
chances—and that tendency explains the harms that befall them—
is victim blaming.40  
I. A BRIEF SNAPSHOT OF VICTIM BLAMING 
It is neither within our professional expertise nor our pri-
mary purpose to delve deeply into the psychology of victim blaming. 
Defenses in civil actions or explanations of seeming product fail-
ures predicated on consumer use, reasonably foreseeable misuse, 
and use that is at odds with the producer’s intentions, focus on 
and blame consumers for the harm they sustained.41 Contribu-
tory negligence and comparative fault (victim blaming doctrines) 
are central to understanding tort law and are predicated on the 
assumption that the actions (or inactions) of product users must 
be a central part of assessing civil liability.42 
There are many explanations for victim blaming. We will 
mention just two: (1) the hope of avoiding tort liability or regulatory 
                                                                                                                        
39 This school of thought, often called Risk Compensation Theory (“RCT”) (or, 
sometimes, “moral hazard”), posits that safety measures are almost always offset 
by consumers taking more risks and, therefore, are useless and counterpro-
ductive. Although occasionally persuasive, RCT has been increasingly debunked 
as more evidence accumulates that safety measures have resulted in a “marked 
decline in injury deaths in most of the world over the last 50 years.” Barry Pless, 
Risk Compensation: Revisited and Rebutted, 2 SAFETY 1, 6 (2016). 
40 See id.  
41 See Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2001). 
42 See Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 791, 806 (1990) 
(discussing victim blaming and other perils of tort law); Michael D. Green, The 
Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products 
Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103, 1104–05 (2002); Frank L. Maraist 
et al., Answering a Fool According to His Folly: Ruminations on Comparative 
Fault Thirty Years On, 70 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2010) (overview of compara-
tive fault and “foolhardy” plaintiffs); William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 
41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953) (on the jurisprudence of comparative fault and 
the challenge of addressing alleged misconduct of victims); David W. Robert-
son, Love and Fury: Recent Radical Revisions to the Law of Comparative Fault, 59 
LA. L. REV. 175, 188 (1998) (advocating the use of comparative fault and not 
contributory negligence); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Two Wrongs 
Do Not Make a Right: Reconsidering the Application of Comparative Fault to 
Punitive Damage Awards, 78 MO. L. REV. 133, 134–35 (2013) (nuanced dis-
cussion of comparative fault and punitive damages). 
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sanction, and (2) the heartfelt need to trust the safety of the world 
around us.43 In assessing this aspect of our regulatory and civil jus-
tice systems, we have no difficulty assessing the liability avoidance 
rationale.44 The second rationale requires a brief explanation. 
It is our observation that after learning of an unexpected 
and horrifying incident or accident, there seems to be an impulse 
(or even unstated hope) that somehow, the victim is at fault.45 
This may well emanate from an understandable need to distance 
oneself from hazard.46 
We think it self-evident that the closer we get to catastro-
phe, the more relatable and frightening catastrophe becomes. We 
neither sought verification nor believe it necessary to borrow from 
other disciplines to support this observation. However, we did test 
the premise (admittedly unscientifically).47 For this exercise, we 
invented and then told our “subjects” (law students, law school 
administrators, and law faculty) two stories. Both stories started as 
follows: “Did you see that piece in the paper this morning about ...?” 
The first story finished the sentence by describing a par-
ticularly violent crime and waiting to see the response. Over and 
over, we heard sympathy for the victim and a question about where 
the crime took place. Different answers regarding location produced 
different results—but consistently, when we said the crime oc-
curred in some far-flung part of the city, the discussion would end 
within a minute or two. Once distanced from the threat, the inci-
dent became less frightening. 
The second story finished the sentence by describing a se-
vere and deadly product failure (we used both consumer goods and 
pharmaceuticals). Again, after sympathy, we heard a different type 
of distancing. It came in the form of a suggestion from our subjects 
                                                                                                                        
43 See Popper, supra note 25, at 186, 190. 
44 See generally POPPER, supra note 15 (exploring the arguments of those who 
seek to limit or change civil liability and those who oppose those limitations). 
45 Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice 
and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1393 (2003) (ex-
planations of unexpected harm are not always premised on fact: “We blame 
the fight on the bully, the accident on the klutz.”) 
46 See Popper, supra note 25, at 201. 
47 We apologize to those social scientists and empiricists who find our methods 
unconvincing and primitive. We accept your criticism. We also believe that this 
insight is beyond question. 
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that something so unexpected may well have been the result of 
the user/victim not paying attention, not reading instructions, i.e., 
that the victim facilitated, invited, and was responsible for the 
catastrophe.48 Distancing and victim blaming49 are benign fanta-
sies50 that support the hope that we live in a world where harm 
befalls those who fail to exercise due care, fail to protect them-
selves in ways that we, the “careful” people, would not let happen.51 
We do not put these thoughts forward as an excuse for the gen-
eral tendency to blame victims—but rather as an explanation of 
one force driving victim blaming at a personal level. After all, who 
wants to think we live in a world where the most innocent among 
us, for no reason whatsoever, can suddenly fall victim to something 
so terrifying and inexplicable?52 This may explain why our civil 
                                                                                                                        
48 Michael L. Rustad, Heart of Stone: What is Revealed About the Attitude 
of Compassionate Conservatives Towards Nursing Home Practices, Tort Reform, 
and Noneconomic Damages, 35 N.M. L. REV. 337, 360 (2005) (“Few themes reso-
nate more with the American public than ‘blaming the victim.’”). 
49 Victim blaming is nothing particularly new. Mary J. Davis, Individual and 
Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault in Products Lia-
bility, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 318 (1994) (tracing victim blaming back to ancient 
Rome: “Just as twentieth century defendants seek to blame the victim, the 
Romans commonly looked to the plaintiff’s conduct (or the conduct of the plaintiff’s 
slave) as a means of avoiding liability.” [footnote omitted]). 
50 That illusion can be shattered when something awful happens to a loved 
one who, in fact, was paying attention, attentive, doing everything “right”—and 
yet, is a victim. While it may seem odd in an article of this nature, we share 
with you the following vignette. On January 11, 1982, Professor Popper’s oldest 
son, then just under the age of four, was in a supermarket with his mother when, 
without warning, a vending machine fell on him and nearly killed him. It was 
a freak accident—terrifying at every level. After extensive analysis, it turned out 
that the actual cause of the accident was faulty design of the machine—but for 
months—and even still today—whenever that unthinkable and life-changing 
event came up, people first asked, “What was he doing? Maybe he was pulling 
on the machine? Climbing on it?” 
51 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Essay: A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine 
Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1767–68 (2014) (“We prefer to believe that things 
happen for a reason, and thus that victims of harms deserve their fate ... . 
[This] may help explain how jurors determine causation in torts cases.” [foot-
note omitted]). 
52 Incidents of sexual assault can bring out one of the most disturbing and 
infuriating sides of this response set—blaming the victim of the assault. Dripps, 
supra note 45, at 1389 (“In rape cases, the jury may be encouraged to blame 
the victim for sexual activity. This may very well translate into an irrational 
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justice system—tort law generally and particularly product lia-
bility law—tilts in favor of victim blaming.53 
To be clear, our premise is not that people who are harmed 
are universally and uniformly faultless. There are instances where 
people misuse products or use products in ways that are not just 
unforeseeable but are at odds with common sense, times when 
people assume risks and contribute to their own harm(s).54 Our 
premise, however, is that such incidents are not the norm. Our 
concern is that ramped up regulatory standards for product misuse 
envision a world of reckless actors, a world at odds with reality.55 
Victim blaming on an institutional level, however, has an 
entirely different rationale. Institutional or corporate victim blam-
ing is a very profitable strategy.56 When successful, victim blam-
ing capitalizes on the aforementioned human tendencies and allows 
those who cause harm to avoid the cost of accountability.57 How-
ever, in the regulatory domain, where compensatory and punitive 
damages are not in play and the only real question is the safety 
of the products that surround us, the same constructs regarding 
victim blaming should not be relevant. Whether the user of a 
product exercised optimal care, ordinary care, or less than opti-
mal care should not bar effective remedial actions. 
How someone may have used, misused, or unreasonably 
misused a product in the past should play little role in determin-
ing whether that product is sufficiently dangerous to merit CPSC 
                                                                                                                        
inference of consent from the victim’s character.”); Kristen M. Klein et al., Attri-
butions of Blame and Responsibility in Sexual Harassment: Reexamining a Psy-
chological Model, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 92, 94 (2011). 
53 David G. Owen, Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2000) (regarding consumer responsibility for harm: “When a person 
is injured while using a product, the accident may be attributable to some defect 
in the product. But even if a product is defective in some respect, most product 
accidents are caused more by the consumer’s risky behavior in using the product 
than by the product’s defective condition.”). 
54 Barring a plaintiff who contributes to his or her harm has been part of the 
tort law discourse for centuries. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 
1809) (holding one who causes harm to themselves cannot recover in tort). 
55 See, e.g., infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
56 Rustad, supra note 48, at 360 (“‘Victim’s talk’ in the tort arena is used ... 
to disavow responsibility for defective products, bad medicine, and unsafe 
practices ....”). 
57 Id. 
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action.58 At CPSC, the focus should be on the safety and utility of 
the product, taking into account all reasonably foreseeable uses—
and nothing more.  
II. REASONABLY FORESEEABLE MISUSE AND CPSC’S 
STATUTORY MANDATES 
CPSC enforces a number of acts in addition to the Consumer 
Product Safety Act, including the Federal Hazardous Substances 
Act,59 the Flammable Fabrics Act,60 the Poison Prevention Packag-
ing Act,61 and the Refrigerator Safety Act.62 Although these acts 
use somewhat different language in defining their scope, we be-
lieve it to be beyond question that all provide the authority and 
responsibility for these agencies to act in instances of reasonably 
foreseeable product misuse.63 Here is a brief summary: 
Consumer Product Safety Act: In 1968, Congress established 
a study commission, the National Commission on Product Safety 
(NCPS), to determine whether the nation’s consumer product safety 
protections were sufficient to safeguard the public from unrea-
sonable risks of injury.64 NCPS found that an independent safety 
agency dedicated to addressing consumer products was essential.65 
Congress largely followed NCPS’s blueprint for such an agency two 
years later when it enacted the Consumer Product Safety Act.66 
Without question, the NCPS called for the new agency to 
have the authority to act in cases of product misuse so long as 
                                                                                                                        
58 Adler, supra note 4, at 85.  
59 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261–78 (2012). 
60 Id. §§ 1191–1204. 
61 Id. §§ 1471–77. 
62 Id. §§ 1211–14. 
63 See ISO Safety Guidelines, supra note 19, at 2 (defining “reasonably foresee-
able misuse” as “use of a product or system in a way not intended by the sup-
plier, but which can result from readily predictable human behaviour”). The 
Guidelines further provide that “[r]eadily predictable human behaviour” is meant 
to include all users including “the elderly, children and persons with disabilities.” 
See also infra notes 135–40. 
64 See S.J. Res. 33, Joint resolution to establish a National Commission on 
Product Safety, Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466–67 (1967). 
65 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 5 (1970) 
[hereinafter NCPS]. 
66 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2053–54 (2012).  
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manufacturers could reasonably have foreseen such misuse: “the 
manufacturer or seller ought not be absolved merely because the 
consumer used the product in a manner different from that in-
tended. A manufacturer should be responsible for injury to consum-
ers from use or certain types of misuse which could reasonably 
have been anticipated.”67 
Consistent with this theme, Congress made clear its inten-
tion that the agency be authorized to act in instances of reasonably 
foreseeable product misuse.68 As Senator Frank Moss, one of the 
key architects of the CPSA, stated: 
It is ... my hope that [the courts] will take notice of the fact that 
the word “associated” was chosen so as to convey the fact that the 
risk of injury did not have to result from “normal use” of the con-
sumer product but could also result from such things as “exposure 
to or reasonable foreseeable misuse of the consumer product.”69 
We note that the Senate version of the Act included a def-
inition of the term “use,” which explicitly included a reference to 
“reasonably foreseeable misuse.”70 The House-Senate Conference 
Committee that met to work out the differences between the two 
bodies, however, adopted the House version of the Act, which did 
not contain this language.71 
                                                                                                                        
67 NCPS, supra note 65, at 75. The Report further stated, “[m]anufacturers 
must take all practical steps systematically to prevent foreseeable misuse of 
products.” Id. at 62. See generally BRUCE K. MULOCK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION: CPSIA IMPLEMENTATION 
(2009), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RS22821.html [http://perma.cc 
/9JTV-JZQ4]. 
68 The definition of the word “use” in the Senate Report accompanying the 
CPSA confirms this proposition: “The definition of ‘use’ includes exposure to and 
any normal use. In addition, it includes reasonably foreseeable misuse. The ambit 
of risk, then, extends beyond exposure and normal use to those risks presented 
by consumer products being misused if such misuse is ‘reasonably foreseeable.’” 
S. REP. NO. 92-749, at 15 (1972). 
69 118 CONG. REC. 36197, 36198 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972) (statement of Sen. 
Moss).  
70 S. REP. NO. 92-749, at 15 (1972).  
71 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1593 (1972). Although the House bill did not specif-
ically define “unreasonable hazard” (which was selected to serve as the term 
analogous to the Senate’s “unreasonable risk”), it did define “hazard” as “sub-
stantial risk of injury.” Id. at 16–17. 
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One might ask whether this means that Congress rejected 
the Senate’s version that consumer misuse be included in the 
agency’s authority. The answer is clearly, no. Such an interpreta-
tion would misread the dynamic between the two houses in work-
ing out their statutory differences. What actually happened was 
that the Senate broadly conceded to the House on most provisions 
of the Act because the Senate would have placed regulatory au-
thority over almost all consumer products in the new agency: a 
proposition to which the House strongly objected.72 No profound—
or even minor—disagreement over the role of consumer misuse 
was ever raised or discussed between the two bodies.73 
Moreover, if Congress had wished to exclude consumer 
misuse from CPSC jurisdiction, one wonders why it did not do so 
in a much more explicit fashion given how expansive the legisla-
ture had been in extending the scope of the other acts enforced 
by the agency to include product misuse.74 
Finally, if there were any lingering doubts about the au-
thority of the agency to protect consumers injured through rea-
sonably foreseeable product misuse, they were put to rest in 
Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission.75 In 
that case, a lawn mower manufacturer argued that CPSC could 
not regulate its product because consumers assumed the risk of 
injury.76 The U.S. Court of Appeals rejected this argument, not-
ing that neither consumer misuse nor assumption of risk limited 
CPSC’s regulatory authority: 
Congress intended for injuries resulting from foreseeable misuse 
of a product to be counted in assessing risk ... . This principle, 
and not the tort liability concept of “assumption of risk,” governs 
                                                                                                                        
72 See BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT: 
TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 32 (1973) (“It is general practice with 
congressional conferences for each side to give up something in order to gain 
approval of something else, but with the consumer product safety bill, the Senate 
came out with very little of its bill intact. The major hurdle for House acceptance 
was the Senate’s inclusion of broad regulatory authority over almost all con-
sumer products, including food, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, and veter-
inary medicine.”). 
73 Id.  
74 See supra notes 15–38 and accompanying text. 
75 Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 619 F.2d 499, 
499 (5th Cir. 1980). 
76 Id. at 503–04, 513 (challenging the regulation for going beyond its scope 
by including “nonconsumer products”). 
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the Commission’s authority to treat consumers’ foreseeable 
action of removing safety shields as creating an unreasonable 
risk of injury and to issue rules addressing that danger.77  
Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA): The language 
and legislative history of the FHSA similarly make clear that 
Congress intended the Act to extend to instances of foreseeable 
misuse.78 Specifically, in section 2(f)(1)(A), Congress defined a 
“hazardous substance” as including “injuries ... or ... illness dur-
ing or as a proximate result of any customary or reasonably fore-
seeable handling or use, including reasonably foreseeable ingestion 
by children.”79 
Even more telling: In 1966, Congress modified the FHSA 
to expand it from a purely labeling act to one that authorized 
standards and bans.80 In the 1969 amendments, Congress ex-
panded the definition of “hazardous substance” to include “toy[s] 
and other article[s] intended for use by children” if they present 
a mechanical, electrical, or thermal hazard.81 In doing so, Congress 
explicitly included reasonably foreseeable misuse as part of the 
Act’s jurisdiction.82 Consistent with the Act’s direction, the Com-
mission has long maintained a set of test methods for simulating 
use and abuse of toys and other articles intended for children to 
determine whether they present electrical, mechanical, or ther-
mal hazards.83 
                                                                                                                        
77 Id. at 513. 
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(1)(A) (2012). 
79 Id. 
80 Technically, the 1966 amendments authorized only bans, but the distinction 
between standards and bans is semantic only, since most standards effectively 
ban non-complying products and most bans prohibit only a subset of regulated 
products. 
81 Pub. L. No. 91-113, 83 Stat. 187, 187 (1969) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1261–74 (2012)). 
82 15 U.S.C. § 1261(r)–(t). As stated in the Senate Report: “Common to 
each of the definitions [of electrical, mechanical, and thermal hazards] is the 
phrase, ‘in normal use or when subjected to reasonably foreseeable damage or 
abuse.’ The phrase places a significant duty upon the manufacturer of any toy 
or article intended for use by children. Not only must he consider the safety of 
the product in normal use, he must also consider the safety of the article after 
damage or abuse—after predicting what the child using the toy will reasona-
bly do to it or with it.” S. REP. NO. 237, at 6 (1969). 
83 16 C.F.R. §§ 1500.50–1500.53 (1975). Once a toy or article intended for use 
by children is subjected to the appropriate use and abuse test, the Commission 
354 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:337 
Flammable Fabrics Act, Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 
and Refrigerator Safety Act: Briefly stated, the Flammable Fabrics 
Act authorizes the CPSC to establish flammability standards for 
furniture, sleepwear, general wearing apparel, and related ma-
terials “to protect the public against [the] unreasonable risk of 
the occurrence of fire leading to death or personal injury, or sig-
nificant property damage.”84 
“The Poison Prevention Packaging Act ... directs the CPSC 
to mandate ‘special packaging’ to protect children who might 
handle or ingest dangerous household substances.”85 Typically, 
this means that the agency requires child resistant closures on 
products at a cost of pennies per container.86 
Finally, the Refrigerator Safety Act requires that refrig-
erator doors be easily opened from within to prevent child suffo-
cations.87 This Act has proven to be one of the most successful 
pieces of safety regulation ever enacted virtually eliminating 
childhood fatalities while almost certainly reducing the cost of 
making refrigerators.88 
What is common among these statutes is that they are all 
strict liability laws, i.e., their requirements apply irrespective of 
                                                                                                                        
will then examine it to see whether it presents an electrical, mechanical, or ther-
mal hazard, and thus constitutes a banned hazardous toy. See id. § 1500.18 (listing 
banned toys determined to present mechanical, electrical, or thermal hazards). 
84 15 U.S.C. § 1193(a). 
85 Adler, supra note 4, at 90. 
86 Requiring child-resistant packaging on over thirty household items has 
significantly decreased the number of child fatalities per year. Stefan Hellbardt et 
al., Packaging: Child-Resistant Features for Container Closure Systems, 18 DRUG 
DEV. & DELIVERY 57, 58 (2018), http://drug-dev.com/packaging-child-resistant 
-features-for-container-closure-systems/ [https://perma.cc/S82G-N9FA]; see K.A. 
Mack et al., Preventing Unintentional Injuries in the Home Using the Health 
Impact Pyramid, 42(IS) HEALTH ED. & BEHAV. 115S, 119S (2015) (noting that 
“[s]tudies show clear declines in poisonings after the passing of the Poison 
Prevention Packaging Act (PPPA) in 1970” due to the Act requiring various 
household substances be securely packaged in child-resistant packaging) (fur-
ther adding that data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) showed that only forty-two fatal unintentional poisonings were reported 
for children aged 0 to 4 years in 2012); see also Angie Qin, Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, Pediatric Poisoning Fatalities from 1972 Through 2013, 
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMMISSION 3 (2016), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs 
-public/PPPAMortality2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZST-BVXB]. 
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211–14 (2012). 
88 Adler, supra note 4, at 90. 
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proper or improper consumer use.89 In other words, a product 
must comply with CPSC safety rules despite consumer misuse if 
it is to be sold to the public.90 In this regard, the regulatory and 
common law mandates regarding safety are indistinguishable.91 
If a consumer is injured or killed because of the product’s failure 
to comply with a CPSC rule, the manufacturer may be held lia-
ble in tort notwithstanding the consumer’s carelessness.92 
III. WHETHER PRODUCT MISUSE IS TREATED DIFFERENTLY IN 
PRODUCT RECALLS THAN IN SAFETY STANDARDS 
Health and safety agencies encounter product misuse both 
in recalling products and in crafting safety standards.93 One might 
ask whether the two contexts call for different approaches, but 
such a notion finds no support either in law or in public policy.94 
                                                                                                                        
89 See generally Coulter Boeschen, Strict Product Liability Laws, ALLLAW, 
http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/strict-product-liability-laws 
.html [https://perma.cc/P5XB-UNZQ] (explaining that unlike proving fault in 
an ordinary injury case, “strict liability rules—like the one applied to strict prod-
ucts liability cases—does away with the analysis of whether the defendant’s 
conduct met a certain standard.”). 
90 See id. 
91 In most jurisdictions, a failure to comply with a safety rule is considered 
per se negligence if a consumer is injured as a result of the manufacturer’s 
noncompliance. See, e.g., Kaltman v. All Am. Pest Control, 706 S.E.2d 864, 866 
(Va. Ct. App. 2011) (opining on whether the defendant’s use of a pesticide not 
approved for residential use on plaintiff’s home constituted negligence per se); 
Supreme Beef Packers, Inc., v. Maddox, 67 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2002) (alleging negligence per se for violations of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act); Nettleton v. Thompson, 787 P.2d 294, 294 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) 
(vacating and remanding case alleging negligence per se for a fall on an unsafe 
stairway in violation of building code standards); see also Negligence Per Se, 
JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/negligence-per-se/ 
[https://perma.cc/R3UB-WJCX]. 
92 See, e.g., Nettleton, 787 P.2d at 294. 
93 See infra notes 108–14 and accompanying text. 
94 To be clear, we do not claim that the test for declaring a product to be a 
substantial product hazard is the same as finding that a product presents an 
unreasonable risk for purposes of promulgating a safety standard. In the former 
case, the Commission seeks to remove an otherwise legal product from the 
marketplace due to its particularly hazardous nature whereas a safety stan-
dard never touches products currently in inventory or in distribution. A “sub-
stantial product hazard” determination focuses almost exclusively on the risk 
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To explain this point, we start with the obligation of firms 
under the Consumer Product Safety Act to report potentially dan-
gerous products to CPSC.95 One might hypothesize—unpersua-
sively to us—that consumer misuse should not trigger a reporting 
obligation under the Commission’s Substantial Product Hazard 
Reporting Rule because no defect would be present.96 The only 
time a firm would be obligated to report a potentially defective 
product to CPSC would be when a serious hazard arose from the 
“expected” or “proper” use of a product, i.e., when a consumer used 
a product in a manner recommended or approved by the manu-
facturer.97 In this interpretation, even if a consumer used a product 
in a reasonably foreseeable manner, no reporting obligation would 
arise if the consumer did not follow the warnings and instruc-
tions for the product (i.e., the producer’s intention) or that the 
consumer otherwise “misused” the product.98 And, if a firm need 
not report a potential safety problem about a product to the 
agency, a fortiori, the firm would not need to recall it.99 
Aside from the fact that this interpretation of the agency’s 
Substantial Product Hazard Reporting Rule would leave many 
serious hazards undiscovered and unaddressed, it finds no sup-
port in the words of the rule.100 We believe that it stems from a 
tortured reading of the reporting rule that goes back to 2006, 
when the Commission amended the rule to add several factors 
for firms to consider when deciding whether to report potentially 
                                                                                                                        
of a product for which a recall is sought and imposes a higher standard of proof 
than that for setting a safety standard. These differences, however, are irrelevant 
when it comes to determining whether the CPSC has different authority for 
recalls than for standards in instances of consumer misuse.  
95 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12 (2018). Under the Consumer Product Safety Act, firms 
that distribute products and determine that one of their products contains a 
defect which could create a substantial product hazard must immediately inform 
CPSC of this determination. See 15 USC § 2064(b)(3) (2012). 
96 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(a) (obligating the reporting of noncompliance, a 
defect, or an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death). 
97 See id. § 1115.12(b) (noting that a “[f]irm must report information indi-
cating that a consumer product which it has distributed in commerce does not 
comply with an applicable consumer product safety standard or ban issued 
under the CPSA.”). 
98 Id. § 1115.12(c). 
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 2064. 
100 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12. 
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hazardous products to CPSC.101 The additional factors in the 
amendment: obviousness of the risk; the adequacy of warnings 
and instructions to mitigate such risk; the role of consumer mis-
use of the product and the foreseeability of such misuse.102 
When the amendment to the reporting rule was added, 
several consumer groups objected on the grounds that it might 
be interpreted as limiting the scope of reports that needed to be 
submitted to the agency.103 Not being privy to the thinking of the 
members of the Commission at that time, we pass no judgment on 
any subjective or unspoken motives that led to the amendment. 
What we can judge, however, is CPSC’s stated rationale as set 
forth in the Federal Register at the time of publication.104 There 
is no hint of an intent to narrow the scope of the reporting rule. 
To the contrary, the Commission stated: “These revisions are not 
intended to reduce the number of reports to the Office of Com-
pliance, to reduce or change the types of information reported, or 
to suggest a diminished need to report.”105 
Later, the Commission made the same point by arguing 
that the added words merely clarified how the Commission had 
been interpreting its rule for many years: “The Commission staff 
already considers the proposed factors in making decisions about 
potential defects .... Thus, the regulation only makes explicit what 
was already implicit in the Commission’s regulation.”106 
Accordingly, the most that can be said about this added 
language is that it made no substantive change whatsoever in the 
reporting rule. It merely put in writing that which had been the 
practice for many years and has been and continues to be the 
agency’s practice: to require firms to report where a hazard arises 
from foreseeable consumer misuse.107 Moreover, a plain reading 
                                                                                                                        
101 See Substantial Product Hazard Reports, 71 Fed. Reg. 42028, 42029 
(July 25, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1115 (2018)). 
102 Id. (noting that the Commission and staff may consider some or all of 
the factors set forth in paragraph (f)(1) in reaching the substantial product 
hazard determination). 
103 Id. at 42029. Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Kids in 
Danger, and U.S. PIRG (Public Interest Research Group) raised this concern. 
104 See id. 
105 Id. at 42029. 
106 Id. at 42030. 
107 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(g)(1)(iii) (2018) (the Commission “[w]ill consider 
the ... reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the product, and the population 
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of the text of the reporting rule leads to a similar conclusion. As 
amended, section 1115.4 now reads in part: 
In determining whether the risk of injury associated with a 
product is the type of risk which will render the product defec-
tive, the Commission and staff will consider, as appropriate: The 
utility of the product involved; the nature of the risk of injury 
which the product presents; the necessity for the product; the 
population exposed to the product and its risk of injury; the 
obviousness of such risk; the adequacy of warnings and instruc-
tions to mitigate such risk; the role of consumer misuse of the 
product and the foreseeability of such misuse; the Commis-
sion’s own experience and expertise; the case law interpreting 
Federal and State public health and safety statutes; the case 
law in the area of products liability; and other factors relevant 
to the determination.108 
The import of this language is obvious. When deciding 
whether a company should report a potentially dangerous product, 
the Commission will look at virtually every aspect of the prod-
uct’s risk to determine whether there is a defect, i.e., “a fault, 
flaw, or irregularity that causes weakness, failure, or inadequacy 
in form or function.”109 If anything, the words constitute a checklist 
for firms deciding whether to report.110 They serve as reminders, 
not limiters.111 
Finally, keeping in mind that the Substantial Product Haz-
ard Reporting Rule is an interpretive rule promulgated by CPSC 
to provide guidance to the public,112 one wonders why the agency 
would limit the instances in which firms otherwise obligated to 
report should not do so. The illogic of such an approach lends cre-
dence to the notion that the agency’s very broad reporting rule 
                                                                                                                        
group exposed to the product” when determining if the risk to the consumer 
is substantial). 
108 Id. § 1115.4. 
109 Id. 
110 See Substantial Product Hazard Reports, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42029 (“The 
Commission’s intent in adopting this provision is to give further guidance to 
firms about reporting defects in their products.”). 
111 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(g)(1)(iii) (2018) (The Commission “[w]ill consider 
the ... reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the product, and the population 
group exposed to the product” when determining if the risk to the consumer 
is substantial.). 
112 See id. § 1115.1 (1978). 
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remains broad.113 If CPSC’s reporting rule has not been narrowed, 
there is no basis for assuming that its recall authority has been 
narrowed either.114 In short, consumer misuse remains as strong 
a basis for CPSC recalls as it does for safety standards.115 
IV. PRODUCT MISUSE AND HAZARD WARNINGS 
If one were to let manufacturers define what constitutes 
consumer misuse of their products, it would be easy to identify 
misuse. One would simply look to the instructions regarding proper 
use and any deviation from these instructions would be misuse. 
Fortunately, agencies and the courts have consistently rejected 
this approach because it would encourage manufacturers to un-
reasonably limit appropriate consumer uses of their products.116 
As one court put it: “a product is not ‘misused’ merely because 
the manufacturer intended that it be used in a different manner; 
the manufacturer must show that the use which caused the in-
jury was not reasonably foreseeable.”117 In short, in the product 
safety context, a manufacturer may not avoid responsibility for 
making its defective products safe merely because it classifies per-
fectly predictable and completely human behavior as misuse and 
then warns against it.118 Interestingly, even in the product lia-
bility context, a number of courts have held that liability for 
                                                                                                                        
113 The Commission’s guidance to the public—repeated time and again—is 
when in doubt, report. See, e.g., id. § 1115.4 (“[F]irms are urged to report if in 
doubt as to whether a defect could present a substantial product hazard.”). 
114 Manufacturer reporting is a prerequisite to the CPSC exerting its recall 
authority. See generally id. § 1115.2. 
115 See id. § 1115.12(g)(1)(ii). For example, the CPSC has distinctly recog-
nized that the number of products remaining with consumers is a relevant 
consideration, because a few defective products with little to no likelihood of 
causing an injury (even in a minor way) will not typically meet the threshold 
required for a substantial product hazard determination. 
116 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2945 (LexisNexis 2018) (“Misuse 
means ... uses other than those for which the product would be considered suita-
ble by a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances”); 
Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (holding 
that deviation from manufacturer-intended use is not necessarily misuse). See 
generally supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text. 
117 Magic Chef, 546 S.W.2d at 856. 
118 See id. 
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defective designs cannot be offset by warnings—including those 
determined to be accurate, clear, and unambiguous.119 
There is an equally compelling reason for caution in dele-
gating too much authority to manufacturers to use warnings and 
instructions to decide what constitutes product misuse.120 Study 
after study has confirmed that consumers often do not read and 
heed warnings.121 The reasons for this are many and complex, rang-
ing from poorly crafted and placed warnings to consumer re-
sistance to lengthy and unreadable instructions.122 For example: 
? Many consumers fail to read instruction manuals 
of products they believe to be safe or familiar.123 
                                                                                                                        
119 See, e.g., Pinchinat v. Graco, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1147, 1150 (M.D. 
Fla. 2005) (Court granted summary judgment on failure to warn claim where 
warnings were “accurate, clear and unambiguous” but remanded for further 
proceedings on defective design claim); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 
977 S.W.2d 328, 336 (Tex. 1998) (“[W]hen a safer design can reasonably be 
implemented and risks can reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption 
of the safer design is required over a warning that leaves a significant resid-
uum of such risks.”); see also Uloth v. Cty. Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 
(Mass. 1978) (“An adequate warning may reduce the likelihood of injury to the 
user of a product in some cases. We decline, however, to adopt any rule which 
permits a manufacturer or designer to discharge its total responsibility to workers 
by simply warning of the dangers of a product.”). 
120 See Eli P. Cox et al., Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior? A 
Meta-Analysis, 16 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 195, 195 (1997). 
121 See id. (citing a review of approximately 400 published articles that 
concluded “no scientific evidence was found to support the contention that on-
product warning labels measurably increase the safety of any product .... ”).  
122 See, e.g., Susan G. Hadden, Regulating Product Risks Through Consumer 
Information, 47 J. SOC. ISSUES 93, 98 (1991) (discussing problems of highly 
technical and complex warning language); Brad Mehlenbacher et al., On the Read-
ing of Product Owner’s Manuals: Perceptions and Product Complexity, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY, 46TH ANNUAL 
MEETING 730, 730 (2002), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/15419 
3120204600610 [https://perma.cc/UG5H-RSRK]) (discussing the negative impacts 
of important warning information being placed in owner’s manuals). 
123 See Jennifer J. Argo & Kelley J. Main, Meta-Analyses of the Effective-
ness of Warning Labels, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 193, 195 (2004) (analyzing 
the effectiveness of warning labels); J. Paul Frantz et al., Potential Problems 
Associated With Overusing Warnings, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS 
AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY, 43RD ANNUAL MEETING 916 (1999) (looking at the 
use of warnings, particularly the overuse and the negative consequences to 
including them on products); S. Godfrey et al., Warning Messages: Will the 
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? Although consumers claim to like safety training 
videos, few watch them.124 
? Manufacturers too often place warnings in in-
struction manuals rather than on the products 
themselves, resulting in safety warnings not be-
ing read.125  
? Manufacturers too often write warnings or in-
structions in language that is so complex that 
many consumers simply do not understand 
them.126 Regrettably, some risks can be explained 
only with words that are technical, long, or not 
in common use.127 
? Merely because a consumer reads and under-
stands a warning does not mean that the con-
sumer will necessarily heed the warning.128 
                                                                                                                        
consumer bother to look?, in HUMAN FACTORS PERSPECTIVES ON WARNINGS 
53, 55 (1994) (providing studies on how consumers perceive household prod-
ucts and what factors cause them to look for warning labels). Hadden, supra 
note 122, at 97 (discussing the benefits of information provision for consumer 
protection, but also the downfalls and assumptions it relies on); David W. Stewart 
& Ingrid M. Martin, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: 
A Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research, 13 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 
1, 6 (1994) (noting that even when consumers are less familiar with a prod-
uct, they are more likely to focus on information about product attributes and 
uses than warning information); Michael S. Wogalter et al., Consumer Prod-
uct Warnings: The Role of Hazard Perception, 22 J. SAFETY RES. 71, 72 (1991) 
(researching how a consumer’s perceived danger of a product relates to the 
willingness to read warning labels). 
124 See Mehlenbacher et al., supra note 122, at 733. 
125 See Argo & Main, supra note 123, at 195; Latin, supra note 22, at 1208–09; 
Mehlenbacher et al., supra note 122, at 733; Elizabeth Tebeaux, Safety Warn-
ings in Tractor Operation Manuals, 1920–1980: Manuals and Warnings Don’t 
Always Work, 40 J. TECH. WRITING & COMM. 3, 23 (2010) (discussing conse-
quences, specifically the common fatalities resulting from tractor operators’ 
failure to read safety warnings). 
126 See Hadden, supra note 122, at 98. 
127 See id.; David R. Lenorovitz et al., Mitigating Product Hazards via User 
Warnings Alone: When/Why ‘Warnings-Only’ Approaches Are Likely to Fail, 24 
HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS MFG. & SERV. INDUS. 275, 295 (2012) (criticizing 
the sole use of inadequate product warnings on vehicles with known hazards). 
128 See, e.g., Christopher M. Heaps & Tracy B. Henley, Language Matters: 
Wording Considerations in Hazard perception and Warning Comprehension, 
133 J. PSYCHOL. 341, 350 (May 1999) (testing the efficacy of warning labels 
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? Manufacturers too often place a multitude of 
warnings on products that overwhelm consumer 
attention.129 
? Two groups—the poor and elderly—often require 
carefully crafted warnings that may be difficult 
to develop.130 
? In a “Catch-22”-type syndrome, consumers will 
read warnings if they know that a product is po-
tentially dangerous, but they may not know that 
a product is dangerous unless they read the 
warnings.131 
These and other caveats about the efficacy of warnings and 
instructions remind us that those who rely on them as a safety 
strategy often do so cynically, seeking to avoid liability despite 
knowing that warnings alone do little to protect consumers from 
unreasonable harm. They also realize that other approaches, such 
as product redesign, are almost always more effective. In fact, 
the public health community has long promoted a safety hierar-
chy that prioritizes its approaches to product hazards as follows:  
? Product redesign to eliminate the hazard.132 
? Shielding to place the hazard safely away from 
the consumer.133 
? Last resort: warnings if redesign and shielding 
are not feasible. 134 
                                                                                                                        
on household cleaners); Stewart & Martin, supra note 123, at 10–13; A.G. 
Vredenburgh & J. Helmick-Rich, Extrinsic Nonwarning Factors, in HANDBOOK 
OF WARNINGS 373, 380 (Michael S. Wogalter ed., 2006). 
129 See Frantz et al., supra note 123, at 917. 
130 See Argo & Main, supra note 123, at 195; Hadden, supra note 122, at 93. 
131 See Hadden, supra note 122, at 97. 
132 See Marc Green, Safety Hierarchy: Design versus Warnings (2000), 
http://www.visualexpert.com/Resources/safetyhierarchy.html [https://perma.cc 
/CU7X-F32L].  
133 See id. 
134 See id.; see also Lenorovitz et al., supra note 127, at 277; Michael S. 
Wogalter & Kenneth R. Laughery, WARNING! Sign and Label Effectiveness, 
5 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 33, 36 (1996). 
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V. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRODUCT MISUSE 
Although our focus has been on the United States, we feel 
it useful to broaden the discussion at this point to demonstrate the 
similarity of treatment of product misuse issues by the interna-
tional community. We turn therefore to policy pronouncements 
from ISO, the International Organization for Standardization, an 
independent, non-governmental body of standards bodies head-
quartered in Geneva, Switzerland.135 ISO is the world’s largest 
developer of voluntary standards, having produced over twenty 
thousand standards covering everything from manufactured prod-
ucts to food safety, agriculture, and health care.136 
In 2014, ISO issued a set of Safety Guidelines for ISO 
standards.137 What is particularly compelling about ISO’s guide-
lines is their insistence that safety standards address reasona-
bly foreseeable misuse. The Guidelines do this by describing how 
producers and others should achieve what the Guidelines describe 
as “tolerable risk.”138 Below is an excerpt from the Guidelines’ 
description of the necessary considerations in achieving tolera-
ble risk. 
 
 6.2 Tolerable Risk 
6.2.1 All products and systems include hazards and, therefore, 
some level of residual risk. However, the risk should be reduced 
to a tolerable level ....  
6.2.3 Drafters of standards shall consider safety aspects for the 
intended use and the reasonably foreseeable misuse of products 
and systems, and apply risk reduction measures to achieve a 
tolerable risk level. 
6.2.4 Drafters of standards shall also consider reasonably foresee-
able uses of the product which, even if they are not intended 
uses are readily predictable based on the collective experience 
of the end user population. In particular, when determining 
                                                                                                                        
135 See About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org 
/about-us.html [http://perma.cc/3MNZ-GERP]. ISO was founded in 1926 as the 
International Federation of National Standardizing Associations. After World War 
II, in a coordinated move with the United Nations, it was reinstituted as ISO. Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See ISO Safety Guidelines, supra note 19. 
138 Id. at 2 (defining tolerable risk as the “level of risk that is accepted in a 
given context based on the current values of society”). 
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the risk posed by consumer products, consideration should be 
given for products that are intended for, or are used by, vul-
nerable consumers139 who are often unable to understand the 
hazard or the associated risk. 
6.2.5 To many suppliers, it might seem that the end user does 
not use the product for its intended purpose or in the manner 
intended. However, predictable, known human behavior should 
be considered in the design process.140 
In short, despite the laments of some naysayers that product 
misuse ought not be the concern of producers, standards writers, 
or the government, we believe that an overwhelming international 
consensus exists that enlightened policymakers need to protect 
end users from harm arising from foreseeable product misuse. 
CONCLUSION 
There have been too many instances in which consumers, 
especially parents, have come before CPSC to urge the agency to 
take regulatory action against hazardous products that have 
harmed their families even though a finger of blame might be 
pointed at them for their carelessness or negligence.141 A num-
ber of these individuals have confessed that they previously had 
                                                                                                                        
139 ISO’s Guidelines define a “vulnerable consumer” as one who is “at greater 
risk of harm from products or systems due to age, level of literacy, physical or 
mental condition of limitations, or inability to access product safety infor-
mation.” Id. 
140 Id. at 5–6. 
141 See, e.g., Complaint at 6, In re Britax Child Safety Inc., Docket No. 18-1 
(Consumer Product Safety Commission 2018), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-pub 
lic/pdfs/recall/lawsuits/abc/2018-02-16-Complaint-In-re-Britax-Child-Safety-Inc 
.pdf?mQufi7GrG7MFQLoRkVvn8oH8e5cyCsDe [http://perma.cc/7M48-5HER] 
(describing injuries to children as part of initial filing in CPSC adjudicative 
proceeding against stroller manufacturer); In re Maxfield & Oberton Hold-
ings, LLC, Compl. at 5–6, CPSC Docket 12-1 (2012), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3 
fs-public/pdfs/lawsuit_maxfield1a.pdf [http://perma.cc/QW3G-PKZE] (describ-
ing injuries to children as part of initial filing in CPSC adjudicative proceeding 
against magnet toy manufacturer); Report #20180816-49B63-2147386132, 
SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV (2018), https://www.saferproducts.gov/ViewIncident/178 
4824 [http://perma.cc/N4WP-T5QW] (report from parent whose child was in-
jured by a malfunctioning stroller); Report #20120906-5E592-1270611, SAFER 
PRODUCTS.GOV (2012), https://www.saferproducts.gov/ViewIncident/1270611 
[http://perma.cc/VU9G-AKND] (report from parent whose child was injured 
by a malfunctioning crib). 
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been dismissive of what they referred to as “those stupid con-
sumers.”142 Yet, when tragedy hits, they suddenly see the wisdom 
of protecting even those who did not precisely follow the manu-
facturer’s instructions or whose attention momentarily strayed—
especially when removing the hazard by redesigning the product 
would be extremely cost-effective. 
To pick one poignant example, in 1992, the Commission 
was petitioned to regulate baby walkers, the cause of numerous 
serious injuries and deaths that occurred when infants tumbled 
downstairs while using baby walkers.143 At that time, one Com-
missioner condemned her colleagues for voting to undertake 
rulemaking, arguing that irresponsible caregivers, not defective 
walkers, constituted the hazard.144 Accordingly, she insisted that 
the only fix should be educating parents about the need to install 
gates at the top of stairs: “Babies who fall down stairs—in and 
out of walkers—are victims of the same hazard—unprotected stairs. 
THE SIMPLE ACT OF CLOSING A DOOR OR INSTALLING 
AND USING A GATE COULD ELIMINATE OVER 40,000 AC-
CIDENTS PER YEAR. Baby walkers do not present a mechanical 
hazard.”145  
To us, the irresponsible party was the dissenting Commis-
sioner, who was prepared to consign tens of thousands of innocent 
children to broken bones, shattered skulls, or even death simply 
because she felt that caregivers did not live up to her notion of 
responsible behavior. What makes her position so frustrating and 
unacceptable is that once the Commission turned its attention to 
                                                                                                                        
142 See Elaine Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 77 (1966) (presenting the classic study show-
ing that the worse the consequences of an accidental occurrence, the greater 
the tendency of others to assign responsibility to the accident victim and explicat-
ing the defensive attribution theory). See also Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of 
Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and 
Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
597, 612 (1997) (noting that bystanders not only blame the victim, but often try 
to distance themselves from the victim in effort to preserve their belief that 
they will not find themselves in a similar situation). 
143 Baby Walkers; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for 
Comments and Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 39306, 39307 (Aug. 2, 1994). 
144 See Statement of Commissioner Mary Sheila Gall on Proposed Gov-
ernment Regulation of Baby Walkers (June 30, 1994). 
145 Id. 
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the problem, manufacturers quickly developed a simple yet elegant 
solution: attaching plastic “skids” on the bottom of the walkers’ 
frames that acted as a brake when a wheel went off a step.146 
This inexpensive fix prevented the walker from tumbling down 
the stairs, virtually eliminating the hazard.147 
We have seen numerous other situations in which objec-
tions have been raised to effective safety solutions, simply be-
cause consumers acted in perfectly human and predictable ways 
that could be classified as careless, even though safety solutions 
existed that were nonintrusive and inexpensive.148 The typical 
response is to offer warnings to consumers and then criticize and 
abandon them when they (predictably) do not follow the warn-
ings—an approach we refer to as “warn and scorn.”149 
We hope for and expect a more humane response from 
policymakers at health and safety agencies. Blaming consumers 
who used a product and were injured or killed as a result, simply 
because their reasonably foreseeable use was somehow at odds with 
the use intended by the producer or designer, is not just inhu-
mane and reprehensible. It is truly bad public policy particularly 
when it is the basis to justify regulatory inaction. Using foresee-
able consumer behavior—victim blaming—to undercut regulatory 
goals is unacceptable. It deviates from the clear congressional 
mandate at CPSC and turns fundamental notions of accounta-
bility upside down.150 A legal culture that scapegoats consumers 
is little more than a grotesque symptom of pathological regulatory 
                                                                                                                        
146 See, e.g., Chicco Walky-Talky Baby Walker, AMAZON, https://www.amazon 
.com/Chicco-Walky-Talky-Walker-Flora/dp/B01LPQ41HU/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1_a 
_it?ie=UTF8&qid=1538331975&sr=8-1-fkmr0&keywords=Chicca%2BWalky 
%2BTalky%2BBaby%2BWalker%2C%2BFlora&th=1 [http://perma.cc/U4N5 
-H4EB] (example of baby walker with brakes). 
147 See id. 
148 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S8452 (daily ed. July 31, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Biden) (describing an instance of Commissioner Gall opposing simple fire safety 
solutions). 
149 There is a better way. Scholars such as William Askren, an industrial 
psychologist, have developed extremely helpful tools for assessing and minimiz-
ing risks arising from the reasonably foreseeable misuse of products. See William 
B. Askren, Predicting and Evaluating Misuses of Products, 13 ERGONOMICS IN 
DESIGN 15, 16–18 (2005), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1064 
80460501300105?journalCode=erga [http://perma.cc/CW6S-V7ZK]. 
150 See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
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capture.151 It undermines the deterrent effect of both product 
safety regulation at CPSC and the broader deterrent effect of 
tort liability in the civil justice system.152 Seen in that light, a 
ramped up consumer misuse standard rewards those who create 
risks and punishes those who are harmed.153 That cannot possi-
bly be the legacy anticipated when CPSC was formed nearly a 
half-century ago.154 
 
                                                                                                                        
151 See generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The 
FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005) (assessing the means by which busi-
ness interests effectively insinuate their perspectives on regulatory action); 
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 1 (1997); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, 
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013). 
152 See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text; supra note 25 and ac-
companying text. 
153 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
154 The agency was created and first went into operation in 1972. Who We 
Are—What We Do For You, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, https://www.cpsc 
.gov/Safety-Education/Safety-Guides/General-Information/Who-We-Are---What 
-We-Do-for-You [http://perma.cc/7M6X-LJPB]. 
